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Mainstream parties in the Nordic countries have tried to deal
with the rise of the far-right through a mix of isolation,
tolerance and even collaboration.
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Recent years have seen a rise in support for right-wing populist parties in Norway, Finland,
Sweden and Denmark. Anders Ravik Jupskås writes that mainstream parties in these
countries, faced with this growth, have chosen between four different strategies: ignoring
far-right parties, isolating them, adopting some of their policies, or collaborating with them in
order to gain office. He finds that there is no ‘best’ strategy for mainstream social democratic
parties, but that they would also do well to acknowledge some of the issues, such as
immigration, that the populist right often gain traction from.
Since 2010, when the Sweden Democrats (SD) gained 5.7 per cent of  the vote and 20 seats in the
Swedish parliament, a (right-wing) populist party has been present in all Nordic parliaments. Recent polls
show a f urther increase in support f or the SD. Despite several scandals in late 2012, the SD has become
Sweden’s third largest party enjoying support f rom about 9 per cent of  the electorate. The SD is,
however, still the most inexperienced and smallest of  the Nordic populist parties.
In Norway and Denmark, two Progress parties had already emerged in the “earthquake election” of
1973. However, while the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) has become f airly integrated in the Norwegian
party system af ter years of  ideological conf rontations and organisational disputes, the Danish party
disappeared f rom Danish polit ics in the 1990s only to be replaced by the Danish People’s Party (DF). In
the most recent elections in Norway and Denmark, the populist parties gained 22.9 and 12.7 per cent of
the votes respectively. These results make FrP the second largest party in Norway, and DF the third
largest party in Denmark. However, while the support f or the DF seems to have stabilised, recent polls in
Norway indicate that the Conservative party will replace FrP as the largest right-wing party in the
f orthcoming election in September 2013. The FrP has already suf f ered substantial electoral losses in the
local election (down to 12 per cent) which was held in the immediate af termath of  the lethal right-wing
terrorist attacks on July 22, and current polls give the party no more than 16-17 per cent.
In Finland, the True Finns (PS) experienced huge
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In Finland, the True Finns (PS) experienced huge
electoral success in 2011, comparable to FrPd in 1973,
Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 Dutch election, and Forza
Italia in the 1994 Italian election. While the PS received
4 per cent in 2007, 19 per cent voted f or the party f our
years later. Recently the party received 18.3 per cent in
a nationwide opinion poll, making the party slightly
bigger than the Social Democrats.
Party family with variation
Although we might put these f our parties into one
party f amily, they dif f er not only in terms of  electoral
success, but also with regard to historical legacy,
ideology and organisational strength.
The FrP, being rooted in an anti- tax and anti-
bureaucracy undercurrent, is f ar more right-wing in
economic policy, more pro-EU and less hostile to
globalisation compared to the other parties. In f act,
except f or its pronounced anti-establishment f eature
and excessive f ocus on Islamisation, the party
resembles continental, as well as Nordic, conservative
parties. The party has also built a more tradit ional and
prof essional party organisation with quite a f ew
members and local branches. DF also has an anti- tax
legacy, but has nevertheless transf ormed into a more typical populist radical right party f ocusing on
issues such as Islam, immigration, national identity, law and order and anti-EU. DF’s party organisation is
also more top-down, less comprehensive (in terms of  members and local branches) and its members are
less active.
The Swedish party, SD, is the only successf ul populist party in the Nordic region which was – and to
some extent still is – embedded in the extreme right subculture. Although the party – and in particular the
party leadership – has copied DF and worked hard in recent years to broaden its appeal, it is still by and
large a “single- issue” party appealing primarily to anti- immigrant sentiments. Its organisational f eatures
are less studied, but f ormally it is more democratic than DF and it has increased its number of  members
substantially in recent years. The PS is the only party with a more lef t-wing populist undercurrent – or
what may be labelled “agrarian populism”. The predecessor of  the PS, the Finnish Rural party was f ormed
in 1959 as a splinter party f rom the Agrarian party to protect rural small holders and their tradit ional
values.
Contemporary Finnish populism is still inf luenced by this tradit ion, making it less hostile towards state
intervention and consequently more lef t-wing on economic issues. In terms of  party organisation, the PS
has to a large extent been built up around the charismatic leader Timo Soini. However, just as with the
other populist parties, PS, too, seems to work systematically in penetrating local communities
organisationally.
The ideology and legacy – and perhaps also organisation (at least in the Danish case) –do constitute an
important backdrop in better understanding the dif f erent patterns of  mainstream reactions in the Nordic
countries.
Reactions of mainstream parties
Faced with the rise of  populist parties and new issues (e.g. most notably immigration and national
identity), mainstream parties can – in theory – choose between at least f our dif f erent strategies: ignore,
isolate, adopt or collaborate.  First, mainstream parties need to decide whether they will disengage or
engage. If  they decide to disengage they can either (S1) ignore the party hoping it will simply go away or
they can try to (S2) isolate the party either legally (as of ten discussed in Germany) or polit ically (as in the
Belgian or French case). If  they decide to engage, they can either (S3) adopt the policy or issues put
f orward by populist parties or they can (S4) collaborate with the populist party in order to gain of f ice (as
in the Austrian, Dutch and Italian case). What have been the strategies in the Nordic countries?
Sweden
In Sweden, the mainstream reactions come pretty close to polit ical isolation – or what has been called
cordon sanitaire elsewhere. While the f ormer populist party New Democracy f unctioned as a support
party f or the centre-right government in the early 90’s, this is seen as completely unacceptable with
regard to the SD, given the party’s legacy and illiberal ideology. “We shall not collaborate with the SD”,
was the message f rom Prime Minister Fredrik Reinf eldt af ter the election, and the Greens, init ially
f orming a pre-electoral coalit ion with the Social Democrats and the Lef t, agreed to collaborate with the
centre-right government in order to make sure that the SD could not blackmail the government on
immigration policy.
However, given that the current right-centre government is a f ew seats short of  having a majority in
parliament it is dif f icult to completely ignore the SD. As a result of  the ‘hung parliament’ it should come as
no surprise that there has been contact between the government and the SD, though it is still inf ormal,
sporadic and marginal.
The most obvious impact f rom the SD’s presence in national polit ics so f ar is probably related to the
public discourse. SD’s posit ion as a parliamentary party has made it dif f icult f or the mainstream parties
to stick to the ‘def use’ strategy, simply because the SD continuously are trying to polit icising the issue.
Moreover, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the party might be helped the modern mass media, which
values (new) polit ical conf licts. For instance, in the party leader debate at the beginning of  October 2012,
the TV program Agenda f or the f irst t ime asked the question “How much immigration can Sweden
handle?”. Not only was this a strong indicator of  increased saliency of  the immigration issue, but it also
shows how f ast the populist f raming of  this particular issue is adopted by mainstream actors.
Denmark
In Denmark, mainstream parties of  the right tried to def use the immigration issue in the 80’s, bef ore they
started adopting a more restrictive issue posit ion in the 90’s and 2000’s, even bef ore DF was f ounded.
Not surprisingly, the DF was quickly accepted as a support party f or the right-wing government –
consisting of  the Liberal Party (V) and the Conservative party (K) – which took of f ice in 2001. The
prolonged collaboration between the governmental parties and DF, which lasted until 2011, made
observers ref er to the Danish government as the ’VKO-government‘, in which ‘O’ stands f or DF. During
this period, DF obtained a powerf ul posit ion, inf luencing several policy areas (most notably a more
restrictive immigration and integration policy). Representative membership surveys in 2000 and 2012 also
show that the DF has become less and less disliked among Danish party members, particularly among
members of  the other mainstream right-wing parties. While half  of  the members of  V strongly disliked the
DF in 2000, no more than 14 per cent did so in 2012. Similar f igures can be observed with regard to K.
Among the centre- lef t parties (EL, SF, S and RV), the antipathy is still strong: more than 80 per cent say
they strongly dislike the DF.
Nevertheless, even the Social Democrats seem to have adopted some of  the DF’s policy posit ions in the
2000’s, which is partly related to the f act that the restrictive f action within the party seems to be slightly
bigger than the liberal f action. In short, the Danish experience can be characterised by mainstream
parties collaborating with the populist right and all big parties adopting at least parts of  the DF’s policies.
The DF’s success in terms of  policy inf luence and electoral support made the strategy called “one f oot
in-one f oot out” an attractive model f or other populist parties elsewhere (e.g. PVV in the Netherlands).
This strategy might be abandoned in the coming years, as Pia Kjærsgaard promised the party members
(and voters) that the DF will seek of f ice in the f uture when she resigned earlier this year. However, it
should be noted that the current party leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, moderated this of f ice-seeking
strategy somewhat in a recently conducted interview, saying the party still dislikes polit ics of  compromise.
Norway
In Norway, the relationship between the FrP and the other non-socialist parties is not as f ormalised or
harmonious as it was between the DF and the two mainstream right-wing parties. The centre- lef t and
centre-right governments in Norway have always kept the FrP at arm’s length. Firstly, they have not
exclusively made state budget agreements with the FrP, but also with the Labour party in two out of  nine
occasions since 1985. Secondly, all mainstream parties have been morally and ideologically crit icising FrP. 
However, in 2009, the Conservatives declared of f icially f or the f irst t ime that they could enter of f ice with
the FrP, and in 2012 the Liberals and the Christian People’s Party also somewhat reluctantly opened the
door f or the FrP. Looking at the changing levels of  sympathy among party members, this development
does not come as a surprise. Among the Conservatives, the share of  members who strongly dislike the
FrP has never been quite high; 13 per cent in 1991 and 2000, and only 9 per cent in 2009. Amongst the
Liberals, the f igures have dropped f rom 75 to 66 per cent f rom 1991 to 2009, and in the Christian
People’s Party f rom 64 to 23 per cent. The opposition against the FrP is simply eroding.
At the local level, FrP has been tolerated f or a long time. The party has primarily collaborated with the
Conservative Party, most notably in the capital city, Oslo. However, in recent years, collaboration
patterns with lef t-wing parties have also been observed. While there were a f ew examples of  technical
collaboration (i.e. non-polit ical agreements of  power-sharing) between Labour and the FrP af ter the 2003
local elections with the two parties collaborating in 13 municipalit ies, in which f our of  them expanded to
include polit ical agreements af ter the 2007 local elections. Polit ically, Norwegian mainstream parties have
somewhat half -heartedly tried to def use the immigration issue. However, in recent years, both the
Conservatives and the Labour have adopted some of  the FrP’s policies, though they still shy away f rom
the conf lict perspective advocated by the FrP.
Finland
In Finland, the mainstream reactions towards populism are quite dif f erent than in the other three
countries. Not only does Finland have a long history of  surplus majority governments including the
f ormer populist Finnish Rural Party in the 80’s, the current Prime Minister, Jyrki Katainen, did everything
he could to give the PS governmental responsibility af ter its successf ul election in 2011. However,
knowing how dif f icult such a posit ion can be f or a populist party, the leader Timo Soini (who, by the way,
has written academically on populism) rejected the invitation arguing that the party could not accept the
European Union’s economic support to Portugal. According to Soini himself , it was “a hard decision to
make” and he underlined that the party truly tried to negotiate. The PS is not only dif f erent f rom the
other populist parties in that it rejects governmental posit ions, it also dif f ers in the sense that it would
pref er collaborating with the agrarian Centre Party and the Social Democrats and not the other right-wing
parties.
No straightforward way to deal with the rise of populist parties
In short, the reactions f rom mainstream parties to the rise of  populist parties have dif f ered substantially
across the Nordic countries. While Swedish parties have f ollowed the Belgian and French models of
adopting a cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the populist contender, the Danish mainstream right have been
closer to the Austrian and Italian model of  collaboration and adoption of  policy posit ions. Norway seems
to be located somewhere in between, though Norwegian mainstream parties have chosen a strategy
which more closely resembles the Danish than the Swedish case. Finland is yet a dif f erent story, and has
to be interpreted in consideration of  PS’ legacy and the tradit ion of  so-called inclusive Finnish rainbow
coalit ions.
So, what is the best strategy – based on the Nordic experience – of  containing populist parties? How
should mainstream parties posit ion themselves? These questions are truly hard to answer, not only
because the national specif icity (e.g. role of  the media and other parties, previous mainstream policy and
real problems of  unemployment and immigration) matters a lot, but also because the answer depends on
what is seen as the main objective; attracting votes, maintaining internal cohesion, promoting (the best)
policy or gaining of f ice?
The Nordic experience does not present any straightf orward recipe on how to deal with the rise of
populist parties. Dif f erent strategies have been put f orward at dif f erent t imes in dif f erent countries:
polit ical isolation and conf rontation in Sweden, collaboration and adaptation in Denmark, conf rontation
and partial adaptation in Norway and attempts at inclusion in Finland. Despite these dif f erent strategies,
populist parties have – in all countries – increased their support and been able to polit icise their main
issue(s).
Like elsewhere in Europe, social democratic parties do not seem to benef it electorally by trying to “steal”
the immigration issue f rom the populist right. Moreover, such policy change might cause problems f or any
kind of  broad lef t-wing alliance. Instead, social democratic parties should try to polit icise economic and
welf are issues as a way of  conf ronting mainstream right and populist right parties. In other words, they
need to engage in what the Schattschneider once called the “conf lict of  conf licts”. Af ter all, we know that
populist parties in the Nordic countries seem to perf orm worse when economic issues dominate the
agenda.
However, without making it too complicated, it should also be noted that social democratic parties in
some countries cannot af f ord to ignore problems of  immigration and integration. Given that social
democratic parties do not control the agenda alone, the strategy of  ignoring the issue may move them
into a def ensive posit ion when other right-wing parties (e.g. Denmark) or the media (e.g. Sweden)
successf ully polit icise populist issues. In such cases, social democratic parties could perhaps learn f rom
the Norwegian party, which has acknowledged “the problem” without buying into the “identity threat
perspective” put f orward by the populist parties.
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